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Introduction 
Much has been written about the alleged pro-business bias of the 
Roberts Court.1 According to various commentators, two indicia of the 
 
†  Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This 
Article was prepared for a symposium on “Business in the Roberts Court” 
at Case Western Reserve University School of Law held on September 23, 
2016. I am grateful to Larry Ebner, Robert Gasaway, Karen Harned, Bert 
Rein, Rich Samp, Alan Untereiner, and Luke Wake for sharing their real-
world perspectives about various issues raised in this Article. Terry Ding 
(NYU 2018) provided spectacular research assistance. 
1. I would be remiss if the first and foremost citation here were not: Business 
and the Roberts Court (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016), which contains a 
wealth of references to the relevant literature. 
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Court’s pro-business leanings are, first, its readiness to find state tort 
law preempted by federal law and, second, its skepticism toward Auer 
deference to federal agencies.2 
Whether or not these discrete jurisprudential trends support a pro-
business agenda, there is an inherent tension between them. It is diffi-
cult to reconcile individual Justices’—particularly those identified as 
part of the “conservative core”—pro-preemption positions and anti-
Auer positions, and this tension suggests that the oft-advanced pro-
business narrative warrants a closer look. 
The tension is on clearest display in drug preemption cases, where 
even the most anti-agency deference Justices readily defer to the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), particularly when the agency’s inter-
pretation of its own regulations under Auer is at issue.3 What explains 
this seeming paradox? One plausible hypothesis is that the conservative 
core Justices’ antipathy toward common law tort regulation runs even 
deeper than their hostility toward regulation by federal agencies.4 In-
deed, various contemporary arguments for “taming the administrative 
beast have a distinctly deregulatory thrust”5—namely, the object of 
vilification is regulation itself, whether by agency or common law. But 
when forced to choose a poison, the Justices side with the agency (FDA) 
over common law tort. 
How does unearthing this seeming paradox affect the conventional 
narrative of the pro-business Roberts Court? Perhaps the conservative 
core Justices have indeed followed business interests, which resist reg-
ulation of all forms, but when forced to choose would prefer a single 
federal regulator over multiple forms of state regulation, including com-
mon law tort. If this were so, then examination of the business group 
briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court should reflect the same paradox—
namely advocating in favor of more preemption, including preemption 
by agency action, while simultaneously pushing for reconsideration of 
Auer deference. 
This Article examines the extent to which the business community 
is involved in, and is perhaps even playing a role in perpetuating, this 
paradox. An examination of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases that im-
 
2. See infra Part I.A.  
3. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011) (ruling by way of the 
five more-conservative leaning justices, over a dissent joined by the four more-
liberal leaning justices, that state tort law was preempted based in part on 
Auer deference to the FDA). 
4. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Administrative State and the Common Law: 
Regulatory Substitutes or Complements? 65 Emory L.J. 1705, 1733 (2016) 
(“[I]t would appear that these Justices’ hostility toward the common law of 
torts trumps even their caustic criticism of the ever-inflating administrative 
state.”). 
5. Id. at 1708. 
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plicate questions of Auer deference explodes the very notion of a predic-
table, uniform “business community” position. Depending on the sub-
stantive issues at hand, business groups’ amicus briefs can be found on 
either side of the Auer deference question: advocating for it in some 
instances, and vociferously opposing it in others. In and of itself, this 
lack of uniformity is not a surprise; the position taken with respect to 
Auer deference tends to be the one that best advances the particular 
business group’s interests at stake in that particular case. 
There are, however, two stalwart outliers: The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Businesses (the 
“Chamber” and “NFIB,” respectively). No matter the case, these 
groups steadfastly resist Auer deference. Indeed, the Chamber has been 
consistent in its opposition to agency deference even when the agency 
interpretation at issue ostensibly advances its members’ interests.6 
Many business groups involved in cases where questions of Auer 
deference rear their head tend not to be involved in FDA/federal pre-
emption cases.7 On the flip side, there are a good number of business 
groups who intervene only in FDA/federal preemption cases yet have 
had rare, if any, involvement in cases concerning Auer deference outside 
the preemption context.8 
But two business groups have members with interests in both lines 
of cases: the Chamber and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufac-
turers of America (“PhRMA”), which represents “the country’s leading 
biopharmaceutical researchers and biotechnology companies.”9 It 
should come as no surprise that these groups consistently advocate for 
preemption, as do most or all business groups who submit amicus briefs 
in drug preemption cases. What is of especially great interest here, how-
ever, is the degree to which these groups’—particularly the 
Chamber’s—passionate, consistent advocacy against Auer deference is 
matched by their passionate, consistent advocacy in favor of pre-
emption. As is explored in greater detail below,10 these groups not only 
advocate for preemption, but often explicitly ground their arguments 
on principles of agency deference, even while railing against the notion 
of deference to agencies outside the preemption context. 
 
6. See infra Part II.A.2. 
7. The NFIB, for example, is heavily invested in stemming the tide of regulatory 
overreach by intervening in cases challenging Auer deference, whereas it has 
not tended to be involved in FDA/federal preemption cases. See infra Part 
II.A.2. 
8. The Product Liability Advisory Council (PLAC) provides a paradigmatic 
example here. See infra Part II.B.1. 
9. PhRMA, http://www.phrma.org [https://perma.cc/55M8-MEF5] (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2017). 
10. See infra Part II.B. 
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These groups appear to be taking some steps to harmonize their 
approaches towards these lines of cases. The Chamber and PhRMA 
submitted a joint amicus brief in the most recent drug preemption 
case,11 in which they advanced preemption arguments, but—
strategically—did not ground those arguments on agency deference 
principles.12 It remains to be seen whether they will continue to chip 
away at the paradox in future briefs, and do so by advocating against 
agency deference across the board. 
It also remains to be seen how, if at all, this will affect the Court 
going forward. Perhaps complicating this question most of all is the 
totally unknown landscape that lies ahead in the era of President 
Trump, who has enthusiastically voiced his own anti-regulatory views 
and has stacked his agency appointments accordingly. Will the business 
community continue to feel the need to advocate against agency def-
erence when agencies may be mere regulatory shadows of their former 
selves? Alternatively, might the business community shift strategic 
gears altogether and adjust its focus away from litigation and towards 
lobbying Congress and agencies for clearer language, thus obviating the 
need for courts to defer to any agency interpretation at all? Perhaps 
this thorny paradox may vanish naturally, and relieve the Court of any 
(as-yet unacknowledged) burden to parse through it. 
I. The Roberts Court Under Scrutiny 
The conventional narrative of the pro-business Roberts Court has 
its limits. The Roberts Court has undoubtedly articulated pro-business 
positions firmly against onerous agency regulation and against many 
state law claims. However, the Court’s attack on agency deference and 
fear of a proliferating administrative state oddly vanishes when it comes 
to federal preemption cases involving the FDA. Even the most conser-
vative Justices freely praise the FDA as the optimal regulator of public 
health and safety.13 
A. Pro-Business Agenda: A Simple Story 
Two story lines have emerged in the pro-business narrative of the 
Roberts Court. First, the business community has rallied in favor of 
federal preemption of state tort law claims against manufacturers. Se-
 
11. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
12. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. & Pharm. Research & 
Mfrs. of Am. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–11, Mut. Pharm. 
Co., 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (outlining the Chamber’s and PhRMA’s 
arguments in favor of preemption). 
13. See infra Part I.B. 
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cond, the business community has united in its opposition to burden-
some federal regulation of business enterprises. And, in distinct lines of 
jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has seemed to follow suit. 
1. Hostility to State Tort Law 
Numerous commentators have fit the U.S. Supreme Court’s federal 
preemption jurisprudence into a neat pro-business, anti-consumer narr-
ative.14 A spotlight has been shone on the recent spate of preemption 
cases involving prescription medical devices and drugs. 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.15 was a watershed moment in federal pre-
emption jurisprudence, as the U.S. Supreme Court signaled that, going 
forward, it would read “requirements” in a statutory preemption provi-
sion to include state common law tort claims.16 Charles Riegel sued 
Medtronic under state law for its alleged negligence in designing, man-
ufacturing, and labeling a catheter.17 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
with Medtronic—and the United States and various business groups as 
amici18—that these state law claims were expressly preempted by the 
Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food Drug & Cosmetic 
Act.19 
Turning from medical devices to prescription drugs, in Wyeth v. 
Levine,20 Diana Levine brought a state tort law failure-to-warn claim 
against brand-name drug manufacturer Wyeth for serious injuries that 
 
14. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 Wayne 
L. Rev. 947, 962 (2008) (“[T]he Roberts Court is the most pro-business Court 
of any since the mid-1930s.”); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 
1431, 1472 (2013) (“[T]he Roberts Court is much friendlier to business than 
either the Burger or Rehnquist Courts, which preceded it, were.”). 
15. 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
16. Id. at 324 (“Congress is entitled to know what meaning this Court will assign 
to terms regularly used in its enactments. Absent other indication, reference 
to a State's ‘requirements’ includes its common-law duties.”). 
17. Id. at 320. 
18. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent 
at 27–28, Riegel, 552 U.S. 312 (No. 06-179); see, e.g., Brief of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 2, Riegel, 552 U.S. 312 (No. 06-179) (arguing that state 
tort law claims are preempted under prior decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court); Brief of Prod. Liab. Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Respondent at 19, Riegel, 552 U.S. 312 (No. 06-179) 
(arguing that congressional intent and prior decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court demonstrate that MDA preempts state tort law claims). 
19. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 328–29 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 18, at 27–28). 
20. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
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occurred after administration of an anti-nausea drug.21 Wyeth argued 
that Ms. Levine’s claim was preempted because the FDA had approved 
the warning label on the drug.22 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
Wyeth’s position, notwithstanding support by the United States and 
several business groups as amici.23 But the Court then reversed course 
with respect to preemption of claims against generic drug manufactur-
ers. In PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,24 Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy 
filed state law failure-to-warn suits against the manufacturer of their 
generic digestion medication.25 PLIVA argued that generic drugs are 
required by federal law to have the exact same labeling as their brand-
name equivalents, and thus the plaintiffs claims were preempted be-
cause PLIVA, a generic drug manufacturer, could not have unilaterally 
added any additional warnings onto the drug’s label.26 The U.S. Sup-
reme Court sided with PLIVA27 (and various business groups as amici, 
but this time, against the United States’s position).28 And, in Mutual 
 
21. Id. at 559–60. 
22. Id. at 560–61.  
23. Id. at 580–81. But see, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 10, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249) (arguing that 
the FDCA preempts state tort law claims related to labeling that the FDA 
has approved); Brief for PhRMA & BIO as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 5, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249) (arguing that state tort law 
claims related to labeling undermine the FDA and should be preempted under 
preemption principles); Brief of the Generic Pharm. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 7–13, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249) (arguing 
that preemption applies in FDA-approved labeling cases). 
24. 564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
25. Id. at 610. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 624 (“Here, state law imposed a duty on the Manufacturers to take a 
certain action, and federal law barred them from taking that action. . . . 
Mensing and Demahy’s tort claims are pre-empted.”). 
28. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, PLIVA, 
564 U.S. 604 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501). The government took the posi-
tion that “FDA regulations require [brand-name drug manufacturers] and 
[generic drug manufacturers] alike to act upon new safety information that 
warrants added or strengthened warnings” so that the agency can “determine 
whether the labeling for the generic and listed drugs should be revised.” Id. 
at 12 (quoting 57 Fed. Reg. 17,961 (Apr. 28, 1992)). But see Brief of Apotex, 
Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10–14, PLIVA, 564 U.S. 
604 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501) (arguing that both implied and obstacle 
preemption apply to Mensing’s and Demahy’s claims); Brief of Generic Pharm. 
Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–3, PLIVA, 564 U.S. 
604 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501) (arguing the Congressional policy reasons 
backing preemption and why they apply in this case). 
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Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,29 Karen Bartlett brought a state design 
defect liability claim against a generic drug manufacturer.30 Once again, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state law claim was preempted 
by federal law regulating the manufacture of generic drugs31—a position 
backed by various business groups as amici,32 as well as the United 
States’s position.33 
The Constitutional Accountability Center (“CAC”)34 describes 
Wyeth, PLIVA, and Mutual Pharmaceutical as a “trio of decisions 
addressing prescription drug safety . . . illustrat[ing] the practical im-
portance and real-world effects of the Roberts Court’s business cases, 
with Chief Justice Roberts voting with the business community in all 
three.”35 
Wyeth may seem an odd starting point given that the majority, per 
Justice Stevens, rejected all of the drug manufacturers’ preemption ar-
guments.36 But CAC characterizes Wyeth as “a powerful example of a 
case in which Chief Justice Roberts wanted to move the law in a pro-
business direction, but members of the conservative wing—in this case, 
Justices Kennedy and Thomas—balked.”37 
 
29. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
30. Id. at 2470. 
31. Id. at 2477, 2480 (“Because it is impossible for Mutual and other similarly 
situated manufacturers to comply with both state and federal law, New Hamp-
shire’s warning-based design-defect cause of action is pre-empted . . . .”). 
32. See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. & Pharm. Research 
& Mfrs. of Am. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Mut. Pharm., 
133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (arguing that Mutual’s conflicting federal and 
state law responsibilities militate in favor of preemption); Brief of the Prod. 
Liab. Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12, 
Mut. Pharm., 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (arguing that the FDCA forbade 
Mutual from complying with state law, and thus preemption applied). 
33. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, 
Mut. Pharm., 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (arguing that “[PLIVA’s] holding 
that the FDCA preempts state failure to warn claims against generic drug 
manufacturers controls this case.”). 
34. The CAC’s website describes its mission as “a think tank, law firm, and 
action center dedicated to fulfilling the progressive promise of our Constitu-
tion’s text and history.” About Us, Constitutional Accountability Ctr., 
http://www.theusconstitution.org/about [https://perma.cc/DLV3-8ZWL] 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2017). 
35. Tom Donnelly, Constitutional Accountability Ctr., Roberts at 10: 
Chief Justice Roberts and Big Business 13–14 (2015) http:// 
theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/Roberts-at-10-Business.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U3WU-T9GS]. 
36. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 579–81 (2008). 
37. Donnelly, supra note 35, at 15. 
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PLIVA and Mutual Pharmaceutical raise similar state tort claims, 
but against generic, as opposed to brand-name, prescription drug man-
ufacturers. In both of these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court majority 
holds that the state law failure to warn and design defect claims, respec-
tively, were preempted by federal law.38 Once again, fitting the compact 
narrative, CAC concludes that “[i]n the end, although the legal issues 
in PLIVA and Mutual Pharmaceutical may be complicated, the bottom 
line is easy enough to understand: by siding with the business commun-
ity, Chief Justice Roberts and his conservative colleagues closed the 
courthouse doors to certain patients who have been severely injured by 
generic drugs.”39 
2. Hostility to the Administrative State 
A second pro-business narrative highlights efforts by the business 
community to unite in opposition to aggressive federal regulation. In-
dustry groups commonly decry “executive overreach.”40 Free-market 
advocacy groups warn that “[m]illions of Americans are suffering under 
the weight of burdensome regulation.”41 
Business group hostility towards federal regulation has translated 
into questioning or opposing judicial deference to agency decisions. 
According to the Chamber of Commerce, the “U.S. business community 
has become increasingly concerned in recent years about the consequen-
ces of courts granting too much deference to regulatory decisions made 
by federal agencies.”42 The Chamber has therefore voiced its “strong[ ] 
 
38. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 625 (2011); Mut. Pharm. Co. v. 
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013). 
39. Donnelly, supra note 35 at 17–18. 
40. The Danger of Deferring to the Bureaucrats, Am. Energy All.: Energy 
Townhall (May 17, 2016), http://americanenergyalliance.org/2016/05/17/ 
10592/ [https://perma.cc/9DCQ-ZRTW] (expressing need to “halt[ ] the 
continuous onslaught of executive overreach in all policy areas, including the 
energy and environment sector”). 
41. Letter from Competitive Enterprise Inst., et al., to Members of the U.S. 
Congress (June 7, 2016), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/2016%20Chevron 
%20SOPRA%20coalition%20letter%20-%20Updated%206222015%20%282% 
29%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KZC-JB3Z]. The Competitive Enterprise Insti-
tute argues: “Auer provides a perverse incentive for an agency to issue deli-
berately vague regulations that it can reinterpret as it chooses, avoiding the 
notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act for a 
change in regulation.” Id. 
42. Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Exec. Vice President of Gov’t Affairs, Chamber 
of Commerce of the U.S., to Members of the U.S. Congress (Mar. 18, 2016), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/3.18.16-
_hill_letter_to_congress_supporting_h.r._4768_and_s._2724_the_sepa
ration_of_powers_restoration_act.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY8J-U7DD]. 
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support[ ] [for] congressional efforts to restrain excessive judicial defer-
ence to agency decision making.”43 Nor are such concerns limited to 
groups representing big business. Indeed, small businesses complain 
that they are “disproportionately harmed by overreaching, costly fed-
eral regulations.”44 
The hostility towards Auer deference exhibited by the U.S. Sup-
reme Court’s conservative core is seemingly in line with the thrust of 
the business community’s position. Sixteen years after writing the Auer 
decision, the late Justice Scalia, in Decker, railed against this doctrine 
of deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations, which 
he termed “a dangerous permission slip for the arrogation of power.”45 
Elaborating further, Justice Scalia warned: “[w]hen the legislative and 
executive powers are united in the same person . . . there can be no 
liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or sen-
ate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical man-
ner.”46 
Before Justice Scalia’s untimely death, there was mounting support 
amongst the conservative core Justices for revisiting Auer. In Perez v. 
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,47 Justice Alito empathized with the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s creation of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which required an 
agency seeking to amend a substantive interpretive rule to comply with 
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, suggesting it was:  
prompted by an understandable concern about the aggrandize-
ment of the power of administrative agencies as a result of the 
combined effect of (1) the effective delegation to agencies by Con-
gress of huge swaths of lawmaking authority, (2) the exploitation 
 
43. Id. 
44. Karen Kerrigan, Letter to U.S. House: “Separation of Powers Restoration 
Act,” SBE Council (June 27, 2016, 1:48 PM), http://sbecouncil.org/2016/ 
06/27/letter-to-u-s-house-separation-of-powers-restoration-act/ [https:// 
perma.cc/EM63-B67Z]; see Letter from TechFreedom, et al., to Members of 
the U.S. Congress (July 11, 2016), http://docs.techfreedom.org/SOPRALetter 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALT9-F647] (“Chevron means Internet regulation 
will now be a game of political ping-pong—with the courts resigned to sitting 
on the sidelines, watching the ball bounce back and forth[, creating] ongoing 
uncertainty [that] is particularly damaging to small businesses, who often lack 
the resources needed to comply with shifting regulatory burdens and litigate 
against unfavorable regulatory changes.”). TechFreedom’s letter was cited by 
a sponsor of the bill during the House debate. 162 Cong. Rec. H4615, H4617 
(daily ed. July 11, 2016). 
45. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
46. Id. (quoting Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 151–52 
(Thomas Nugent trans., O. Piest ed. 1949) (1748)). 
47. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
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by agencies of the uncertain boundary between legislative and 
interpretive rules, and (3) this Court’s cases holding that courts 
must ordinarily defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own am-
biguous regulations.48 
Justice Thomas characterized Auer as “a transfer of the judge’s exercise 
of interpretive judgment to the agency.”49 Justice Scalia, perhaps em-
boldened by support from his conservative brethren, made a pitch for 
altogether abandoning the doctrine: “[T]here are weighty reasons to 
deny a lawgiver the power to write ambiguous laws and then be the 
judge of what the ambiguity means. I would therefore restore the bal-
ance originally struck by the APA with respect to any agency’s inter-
pretation of its own regulations . . . by abandoning Auer . . . .”50 
B. Deference to Federal Agencies: A Paradox Emerges 
Thus far, the pro-business Roberts Court story line seems fairly 
straightforward—namely the Court has, by and large, acceded to the 
business community’s interests in resisting common law tort claims 
against manufacturers and stemming the tide of administrative regu-
lations. But obscured from this conventional narrative is consideration 
of a paradox that emerges when the Court’s pro-preemption and anti-
deference lines of jurisprudence seem to collide. Namely, the conser-
vative core Justices’ attack on agency deference and wider distaste for 
and distrust of the administrative state is suspended in federal drug 
preemption cases, in which they give enormous deference to the FDA. 
No doubt this reflects the Justices’ hostility toward the common law of 
torts as a regulator. Indeed, the Justices repeatedly emphasize the insti-
tutional advantages of a regulatory scheme enforced by such an expert 
agency as the FDA.51 They herald the FDA’s broad perspective on lar-
ger public health goals over myopic juries that focus only on the injured 
plaintiff before them when deciding state tort law claims.52 The Justices’ 
 
48. Id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
49. Id. at 1219 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
50. Id. at 1212–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). 
Justice Scalia reiterated the concerns he had outlined previously in Decker: 
“Because the agency (not Congress) drafts the substantive rules that are the 
object of those interpretations, giving them deference allows the agency to 
control the extent of its notice-and-comment-free domain. To expand this 
domain, the agency need only write substantive rules more broadly and 
vaguely, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled in later, using interpretive rules 
unchecked by notice and comment.” Id. at 1212. 
51. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604–06 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(framing the preemption question as partly a choice between the agency’s 
expertise and the expertise of the parties’ witnesses at trial). 
52. See, e.g., id. at 626 (“[J]uries are ill equipped to perform the FDA’s cost-
benefit-balancing function. . . . [J]uries tend to focus on the risk of a particular 
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reliance on Auer deference in this preemption line of jurisprudence 
stands in sharp contrast to the emerging line of cases calling for Auer’s 
demise. 
Consider Wyeth v. Levine, the case in which the majority rejected 
preemption of state law tort claims against a brand-name manufact-
urer.53 In a vehement dissent, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Scalia, criticized the majority for “turning a 
common-law tort suit into a ‘frontal assault’ on the FDA’s regulatory 
regime for drug labeling,”54 embracing the “frontal assault” terminology 
from the United States’s amicus brief in support of Wyeth.55 The 
dissenting Justices showed no hesitation in giving the FDA far-reaching 
deference—in this case, relying on the agency’s view as put forth in a 
preamble to a regulation.56 This expansive view of deference to the 
underlying federal regulator is not easily reconciled with the 
conservative core’s attack on the administrative state.57 
The starkest example to date is the puzzling persistence of Auer 
deference as a pillar of preemption in the generic drug context. In 
PLIVA v. Mensing, in a majority opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court 
defers to the FDA: “[t]he FDA . . . tells us that it interprets its regu-
lations to require that the warning labels of a brand-name drug and its 
generic copy must always be the same—thus generic drug manufac-
turers have an ongoing federal duty of ‘sameness.’”58 In so doing, the 
 
product’s design or warning label that arguably contributed to a particular 
plaintiff’s injury, not on the overall benefits of that design or label . . . . In 
contrast, the FDA has the benefit of the long view.”) (citations omitted). 
53. Id. at 579–81 (majority opinion). 
54. Id. at 606 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
55. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra 
note 23, at 21. 
56. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 622–23 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[P]re-emption is argu-
ably more appropriate here than in Geier because the FDA (unlike the DOT) 
declared its pre-emptive intent in the Federal Register.”) (citing 71 Fed. Reg. 
3933–3936); see also id. at 623 (citing Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996) for the proposition that the 
preamble to the regulation should carry greater weight because the FDA 
includes its understanding of state and federal requirements in the preamble). 
57. It is striking that Justice Thomas (writing a separate concurrence in Wyeth) 
stands alone in eschewing any reliance on agency comments, regulatory his-
tory, and agency litigating positions in implied preemption analysis. Id. at 600–
01 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[N]o agency . . . can preempt a State’s judgment 
by merely musing about goals or intentions not found within or authorized by 
the statutory text.”). For further elaboration, see Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Against Freewheeling, Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Clarence 
Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 63 (2010). 
58. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 613 (2011) (citing Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 28, at 16). 
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Justices invoke Auer deference repeatedly (and with no hesitation): 
“The FDA’s views are ‘controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsis-
tent with the regulation[s]’ or there is any other reason to doubt that 
they reflect the FDA’s fair and considered judgment.”59 As a result, the 
Court “defer[red] to the FDA’s interpretation of its CBE [‘changes be-
ing effected’ drug labeling regulation] and generic labeling regula-
tions.”60 
II. Business Community Agenda 
A closer look at the recent cases implicating Auer deference under-
cuts the very notion of a “business community” position on the issue. 
Depending on the matter at hand, the particular business group(s) 
whose members are affected, and the relevant agency’s interpretive po-
sition on the regulation at issue, business groups might just as likely 
advocate in favor of deference as against it. The two outliers are the 
Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent 
Businesses, who consistently oppose Auer deference. 
A. Agency Deference 
Business groups on the whole have deployed Auer deference argu-
ments strategically, invoking Auer when the federal regulator’s position 
aligns with the business interest at stake while attempting to limit or 
even disparage the doctrine when the federal regulator is at odds with 
the relevant business interest. It would thus seem that there is not a 
consistent or monolithic pro-business hostility to Auer deference. 
Against this backdrop, however, the Chamber has consistently opp-
osed Auer deference.61 And the NFIB—representing 350,000 member 
businesses as the nation’s leading small business association—has iden-
tified Auer deference as the prime target of its attack.62 
 
59. Id. at 613 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). 
60. Id. at 614. Note too that, in Mutual Pharmaceutical, the majority per Justice 
Alito relied on federal drug regulations “as interpreted by the FDA” in deeming 
state law preempted. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2476 
(2013). 
61. See infra Part II.A.2. 
62. See Five Things NFIB Is Doing to Cabin Agency Discretion, Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.nfib.com/content/legal-blog/ 
legal/five-things-nfib-is-doing-to-cabin-agency-discretion-75891/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8M2S-24SZ] (“[I]n United States v. Texas, and in Flytenow v. FAA, 
we argued that it was time for the Court [to] overturn Auer v. Robbins 
. . . .”); Kerrigan, supra note 44 (“[Making sure that] ‘agencies’ interpreta-
tions of law would no longer receive deference [is] exactly the remedy small 
businesses need to get a fair shake in courts.”). The letter praises the intro-
duction of the “Separation of Powers Restoration Act” legislation as “a good 
start to rein in a bureaucracy that is stifling growth, innovation, competitive-
ness, and new business startups.” Id. The Chevron doctrine is another key 
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1. Vacillating Positions on Auer Deference 
a. Reliance on Auer Deference 
Several high-profile U.S. Supreme Court cases illustrate where 
groups representing business and industry interests urged the Court to 
ratify, and even expand, Auer deference principles. 
The American Bankers Association—representing small, regional, 
and large banks throughout the United States63—has made its endorse-
ment of Auer deference plain, at least in cases in which deference to the 
position espoused by the Federal Reserve Board supports its own posi-
tion.  
In Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy,64 a plaintiff class of credit 
card holders sued defendant Chase Bank, alleging that it had violated 
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by increasing interest rates retro-
actively after credit accounts were closed.65 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled in favor of the credit card holders, notwithstanding the 
fact that the Federal Reserve Board interpreted its own “Regulation Z” 
of TILA as not requiring a creditor to provide cardholders with a 
change-of-term notice.66 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Federal Reserve Board also filed an amicus brief in support of Chase.67 
The American Bankers Association sharply criticized the Ninth 
Circuit for failing to defer to the Federal Reserve Board’s interpretation 
of its own regulation.68 “In terms of policy,” the American Bankers 
 
target; this doctrine of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation is 
described as “a dangerous judicial abdication that has fueled overregulation 
and the growth of the administrative [state] for decades.” Id. 
63. According to the American Bankers Association website: “The American Ban-
kers Association is the united voice of America’s hometown bankers[—]small, 
regional and large banks that together employ more than 2 million women 
and men, hold nearly $17 trillion in assets, safeguard $12.8 trillion in deposits 
and extend more than $9 trillion in loans.” About the American Bankers 
Association, Am. Bankers Ass’n, http://www.aba.com/About/Pages/ 
default.aspx [https://perma.cc/LG2F-T7LG] (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). 
64. 562 U.S. 195 (2011). 
65. Id. at 201–02. 
66. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed with a unanimous decision that applied 
Auer deference to the Board’s interpretation that Regulation Z does not 
require a creditor to provide cardholders with a change-of-term notice. Id. at 
208 (“Under Auer . . . we defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulation, advanced in a legal brief, unless that interpretation is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”) (citations omitted). 
67. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Chase Bank, 562 U.S. 195 (No. 
09-329). 
68. Brief of the Am. Bankers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioner at 
4, Chase Bank, 562 U.S. 195 (No. 09-329) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for 
failing to defer to the “interpretation of Regulation Z by the Board, which has 
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Association argued, “the Ninth Circuit’s failure to defer to interpretive 
statements by the Board undermines the banking industry’s ability to 
rely on the Board’s expertise in a ‘highly technical’ area of the law 
where ‘creditors need sure guidance.’”69 The American Bankers Asso-
ciation invoked the “long line of cases beginning with [Seminole Rock, 
the precursor to the Auer doctrine], [in which] the Court has held that 
where an agency interprets its own regulations, ‘the ultimate criterion 
is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling wei-
ght unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”70 
Quoting Auer, the American Bankers Association insisted that “def-
erence to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is warranted 
so long as the interpretation ‘reflect[s] the agency’s fair and considered 
judgment on the matter in question.’”71 
The American Bankers Association was equally emphatic that de-
ference was due even to informally issued agency interpretations.72 It 
took the opportunity to remind the U.S. Supreme Court that the Court 
had “been willing to defer to agency interpretations of regulations where 
they appear in a legal brief, or in an ‘Advisory Memorandum’ issued 
only to internal agency personnel and which the agency appeared to 
have written in response to pending litigation.”73 And it lamented that 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision “calls into question the continued ability 
of financial institutions to reasonably—and safely—rely on anything 
 
recently made its position crystal clear via amicus filings in this and other 
proceedings”). 
69. Id. at 5. (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 
(1980)). The American Bankers Association elaborated: “The [Ninth Circuit] 
panel failed to account for the value to the industry of being allowed to rely 
on official agency statements or interpretations (albeit less formal than a final 
regulation) for guidance with respect to TILA or other regulatory issues.” Id. 
70. Id. at 17. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 
(1945)). 
71. Id. at 18 (omission in original) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 
(1997)); see also id. at 19–20. (“The Board’s plain and repeated statements—
whether they are offered in an amicus brief submitted by the agency or con-
tained in regulatory documents such as the preamble to a proposed rule that 
is published in the Federal Register—plainly ‘reflect the agency’s fair and con-
sidered judgment on the matter in question.’” (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462)). 
72. Id. at 17–18. Note the sharp contrast between the American Bankers Associ-
ation’s position here in favor of deference to informally issued interpretations 
and the vehement opposition to such deference voiced by business groups in 
other cases. See infra Part II.A.1.b. 
73. Brief of the Am. Bankers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 68, at 18; see also id. at 19 (“Courts regularly defer to agency 
interpretations of their own regulations that are embodied in considerably 
less formal statements than those at issue in the present litigation.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The Anti-Deference Pro-Preemption Paradox at the U.S. Supreme Court 
819 
other than formal statements or guidance issued by the Board via notice 
and comment rulemaking.”74 
In Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,75 Sprint 
Nextel and Comptel, two telecommunications corporations that bene-
fited from a Federal Communication Commission interpretation, like-
wise argued for Auer deference.76 In that case, Michigan Bell, a subsi-
diary of AT&T, challenged the Michigan Public Service Commission’s 
interpretation of the Telecommunications Act as requiring incumbent 
local exchange carriers—like Michigan Bell—to give access to their 
equipment and services to competitive local exchange carriers at cost.77 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “Auer deference [is] un-
availing . . . because the [Federal Communication Commission’s] pro-
ffered interpretation is so plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation . . . that we can only conclude that the FCC has attempted 
to create a new de facto regulation under the guise of interpreting the 
regulation.”78 
Sprint Nextel and Comptel were competitive local exchange carriers 
advantaged by the FCC’s interpretation. In seeking Auer deference, 
Sprint Nextel stated plainly that “[a]n agency’s interpretation of its 
own regulations is entitled to deference as long as it is not ‘plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]’ . . . and such deference 
is amply warranted here.”79 It argued that such deference was especially 
 
74. Id. at 19. 
75. 564 U.S. 50 (2011). 
76. Brief for Sprint Nextel Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, 
Talk Am., Inc., 564 U.S. 50 (Nos. 10-313, 10-329); Brief for Amicus Curiae 
Comptel in Support of Petitioners at 2–3, Talk Am., Inc., 564 U.S. 50 (Nos. 
10-313, 10-329). 
77. Talk Am., Inc., 564 U.S. at 55. 
78. Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Covad Commc’ns Co., 597 F.3d 370, 375 n.6 (6th Cir. 
2010). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The majority looked to the FCC’s 
interpretation of its regulations to resolve the ambiguities in the statutory 
scheme, and deferred to that interpretation after finding it “reasonable.” Talk 
Am., Inc., 564 U.S. at 59–67. “[W]e defer to an agency’s interpretation of its 
regulations, even in a legal brief, unless the interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent with the regulation[s]’ or there is any other ‘reason to suspect 
that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered jud-
gment on the matter in question.’” Id. at 59 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997)). 
79. Brief for Sprint Nextel Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra 
note 76, at 19 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461). Sprint Nextel elaborates: 
“[T]he most that can be said about the regulations and orders at issue is that 
they ‘do not give a definitive answer’ to the question presented. . . . [Accord-
ingly,] it certainly cannot be said that the FCC’s regulations and orders unam-
biguously compel a contrary interpretation . . . [so] [d]eference to the FCC’s 
interpretation is therefore appropriate.” Id. at 19–20. Moreover, Sprint Nextel 
argued that there “is no other valid basis for refusing to defer to the FCC’s 
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warranted given “the notorious complexity both of the underlying tech-
nology and of the applicable legal regime,” making this “the archetypal 
case in which deference to the views of an expert agency is appro-
priate.”80 Comptel likewise complained that the Sixth Circuit impro-
perly failed to defer to “the FCC’s rules implementing the statute and 
the agency’s interpretation of those rules.”81 It chastised the Sixth 
Circuit for “substituting its own judgment for that of the expert agency 
not only with respect to the manner in which telephone networks are 
designed and operate but also with respect to the meaning of the expert 
agency’s own regulations” notwithstanding the fact that “Congress has 
delegated to the FCC the authority to resolve any ambiguities” and 
“[t]he FCC’s interpretation of the term is therefore entitled to con-
siderable weight.”82 
In Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council,83 
the Southeast Alaska Conservation Council sued the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers for granting a permit to Coeur Alaska to discharge waste-
water from its mining operations into an Alaskan lake.84 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Conservation Council that 
the Army Corps did not have authority under the Clean Water Act to 
issue such a permit.85 Before the U.S. Supreme Court, a number of 
 
interpretation” because this is neither a situation in which the regulation 
falls within the “parroting” exception to Auer deference articulated in Gonzales 
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006), nor one in which “the agency’s position 
is simply ‘a “post hoc” rationalization’ advanced . . . to defend past agency 
action against attack.” Id. at 20 (omissions in original) (quoting Auer, 519 
U.S. at 462). 
80. Brief for Sprint Nextel Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra 
note 76, at 21. 
81. Brief for Comptel as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 76, 
at 3; see also id. at 17–18 (“The Sixth Circuit found the FCC’s interpretation 
. . . to be ‘so plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’ as to warr-
ant no deference. But the FCC’s interpretation is neither erroneous nor in-
consistent with any regulation.” (citation omitted)). Comptel urged the U.S. 
Supreme Court to grant Chevron deference to the FCC’s rules implementing 
the Telecommunications Act. Id. at 18–19. 
82. Id. at 9–11. 
83. 557 U.S. 261 (2009). 
84. Id. at 266. 
85. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 486 F.3d 638, 655 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (ruling that the Army Corps improperly interpreted the Clean 
Water Act when granting permits). Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. 
Supreme Court accorded Auer deference to an internal memorandum of the 
EPA. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 283–84 (noting that the memorandum “is 
entitled to a measure of deference because it interprets the agencies’ own regu-
latory scheme” (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997))); see also 
id. at 278 (“accept[ing] it as correct” (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461)); id. at 
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business groups filed amicus briefs in support of Coeur Alaska and relied 
explicitly on agency deference doctrines. The Resource Development 
Council for Alaska86 explicitly invoked Seminole Rock to criticize the 
Ninth’s Circuit’s “failure to accord . . . deference in this case,” which it 
argued was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s “long-established 
principle of administrative law,” thus “set[ting] a dangerous precedent 
against the extraordinary deference that must be afforded to an agen-
cy’s interpretation of its own regulations.”87 The National Association 
of Home Builders agreed that the “case boils down to agency def-
erence,”88 and asserted that “[d]eference is due to the expert decisions 
by the [Army] Corps (and EPA).”89 In similar fashion, the Council of 
Alaska Producers urged the U.S. Supreme Court to “reverse the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling, and defer to the expertise of the Corps and EPA, which 
 
284–86 (detailing the five factors that led the Court to conclude that “the 
Memorandum presents a reasonable interpretation of the regulatory regime”). 
86. The Resource Development Council for Alaska is a “trade organization com-
prised of businesses and individuals from all resource sectors.” Brief of the Res. 
Dev. Council for Alaska, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, 
Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. 261 (Nos. 07-984, 07-990). 
87. Id. at 29 (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 
(1945)). The Council argued further that “the Ninth Circuit’s holding . . . runs 
counter to the plain language of the Act, and overturns the EPA’s and the 
Corps’ carefully considered permitting program for the regulation of mine 
tailings.” Id. 
88. Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders Supporting 
Petitioners at 3, Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. 261 (Nos. 07-984, 07-990). The 
National Association of Home Builders—along with the Council of Alaska 
Producers and the National Mining Association—exhorted the Court to accord 
Chevron deference to the Army Corps’ interpretation of the Clean Water Act. 
See Brief of the Council of Alaska Producers as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 3, Couer Alaska, 557 U.S. 261 (Nos. 07-984, 07-990) (arguing 
that the Army Corps appropriately balanced the environmental and economic 
implications of the Clean Water Act); see also Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat’l 
Mining Ass’n, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 14, Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. 
261 (Nos. 07-984, 07-990) (arguing the conflict should be resolved by expert 
agencies); Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders 
Supporting Petitioners, supra, at 3 (“[T]he question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984))). 
89. Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 88, at 3. Here, the National Association of Home 
Builders relied on Chevron (as opposed to Auer) deference, but the thrust of 
its support for deference to the agency based upon its expertise is clear. See 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders Supporting Petitioners 
at 10, Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. 261 (Nos. 07-984, 07-990) (“Whether a discharge 
of sediment is more likely to move downstream . . . ‘is a classic example of a 
factual dispute the resolution of which implicates substantial agency exper-
tise.’” (citing Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376 (1989)). 
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have developed a regulatory regime that addresses the relevant environ-
mental concerns raised in this case.”90 And the National Mining 
Association concurred, stating that “the Court should defer to the 
expert agencies’ resolution of the issue—a resolution that is clear, that 
is of long standing, and that reasonably balances [Congress’s] concerns 
. . . .”91 
b. Rejection of Auer Deference 
Business interest groups just as readily weigh in against deference 
to the underlying regulating agency’s interpretation where the interpre-
tation at issue conflicts with their own agenda. Indeed, in the Auer case 
itself, the business community rallied behind the no-deference position. 
The Chamber of Commerce submitted an amicus brief in support of the 
police commissioners that argued that petitioners were exempt from 
overtime pay requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA).92 The Chamber specifically argued that the Department of 
Labor’s interpretation of its regulations to the contrary “is entitled to 
little or no deference.”93 The Chamber focused attention on the inconsis-
tencies in the position taken by the Department of Labor over time and 
argued that, “[w]hile an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations 
is generally to be followed unless ‘it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation,’ substantially less deference is due when an agency 
has put forth inconsistent interpretations, as the Department of Labor 
has done [here].”94 The Labor Policy Association—“an organization of 
 
90. Brief of the Council of Alaska Producers as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, supra note 88, at 3 (“The facts of this case demonstrate the need 
for deference to a reasonable interpretation of statutory terms—such as that 
provided by the Corps and EPA in this case.”). 
91. Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat’l Mining Ass’n, et al. in Support of Petitioners, 
supra note 88, at 14–15. As an initial matter, the National Mining Association 
argued that the “Clean Water Act’s plain language is dispositive” in favor of 
Coeur Alaska, but that if the Court found the statute ambiguous, “the agencies 
entrusted to fulfill Congress’s commands would be left to reconcile conflicting 
statutory mandates.” Id. at 14. Indeed, according to the National Mining 
Association, the conflicting statutory mandates were “precisely the sort of 
statutory ambiguity that may be resolved by expert agencies—and whose 
resolution thereby is entitled to judicial deference.” Id. at 15. Here, too, the 
National Mining Association invoked Chevron (as opposed to Auer) deference: 
“this principle—that an agency’s resolution of warring statutory mandates is 
analyzed under Chevron—is not open to serious dispute.” Id. at 16. 
92. Brief Amici Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. & the Fair 
Labor Standards Act Reform Coal. in Support of Respondents, Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (No. 95-897), 1996 WL 585673 at *3. 
93. Id. at *16 n.7. 
94. Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) 
and citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 510–12, 514–16 
(1994)). The Chamber argued, in the alternative, that “[i]n any event, the 
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the senior human resources officers of nearly 240 of this nation’s largest 
private sector employers”95—also filed an amicus brief in support of the 
police commissioners, and likewise argued against deference to the ag-
ency.96 The Labor Policy Association contended that “[l]egislative, or 
substantive, regulations are ‘issued pursuant to statutory authority and 
. . . have the force and effect of law,’” but “by way of contrast, a court 
is not required to give effect to an interpretive regulation. Varying de-
grees of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations based 
on such factors as the timing and consistency of the agency’s position.”97 
Thus, according to the Labor Policy Association, “although DOL’s 
interpretations are entitled to some weight,” they are “not ‘entitled to 
the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of . . . dele-
gated lawmaking power.’”98 
The overtime provisions of the FLSA were once again before the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.99 In 
that case, pharmaceutical sales representatives, supported by the Secre-
tary of Labor as amicus, denied that they fell within the “outside sale-
smen” exception to the FLSA overtime requirements.100 The Ninth Cir-
cuit had ruled against them.101 
Various business groups filed amicus briefs in support of SmithKline 
Beecham and against the sales representatives; all attempted to limit 
the scope of Auer. The Chamber of Commerce argued “where, as here, 
an agency’s regulations at most clarify only that certain situations are 
included in the coverage of statutory provision, but offer no guidance 
as to the outer limits of the statute, an agency’s litigation position re-
garding those limits is not entitled to deference under Auer” given that 
“the agency has not engaged with the public or brought its expertise to 
bear on the relevant question of the contours of the statute.”102 
 
Department’s latest interpretation is plainly erroneous and inconsistent with 
the regulations.” Id. 
95. Brief of the Labor Policy Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Auer, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (No. 95-897), 1996 WL 585671 at *1. 
96. See id. at *7–16 (arguing that the Department of Labor’s salary basis test is 
an outdated interpretation that is not entitled to deference). 
97. Id. at *7 (omission in original) (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 
425 n.9 (1977)). 
98. Id. at *8 (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 
499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991)). 
99. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
100. Id. at 2159. 
101. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 401 (9th Cir. 2011). 
102. Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 5, SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (No. 11-204). The 
Chamber argued that the “parroting exception” to Auer deference applied to 
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The Washington Legal Foundation (“WLF”) echoed this theme, 
arguing that “the law does not permit an agency to regulate by amicus 
brief,” because “[w]hatever else Auer . . . may be said to require, it has 
never been understood to ‘permit the agency, under the guise of inter-
preting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.’”103 WLF 
complained that the Department of Labor’s “novel interpretation of the 
FLSA’s outside sales exemption . . . abruptly contradicts the Depart-
ment’s own regulatory and interpretative guidance to the contrary for 
over seventy years.”104 This “abrupt and unexpected departure,” accor-
ding to WLF, indicated that the interpretation “did not reflect the ag-
ency’s ‘fair and considered judgment’ on the matter in question,” and 
instead suggested that the agency was “engaging in an after-the-fact 
 
DOL’s regulation implementing the FLSA. Id. at 19 (“An agency does not 
acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its 
expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to 
paraphrase the statutory language.”) (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 
243, 257 (2006)). 
103. Brief of Wash. Legal Found. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 
at 10, SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (No. 11-204) (quoting Christensen 
v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)). WLF has not been steadfast in its 
resistance to Auer deference. Consider, for example, its amicus intervention 
in Allegheny Teledyne Inc. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 
cert. denied sub nom., Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 540 U.S. 1068 
(2003). WLF argued that the Federal Circuit improperly “dismissed the views 
of the promulgating and implementing agencies,” and condemned in no un-
certain terms the court’s “contempt for basic principles of agency deference.” 
Brief for Amicus Curiae Wash. Legal Found. in Support of the Petition for 
Certiorari at 2, Gen. Motors Corp., 540 U.S. 1068 (No. 03-165). WLF attacked 
each of the three reasons the Federal Circuit gave for affording no weight to 
the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) staff documents: that the docu-
ments were written by CASB’s associate director and were not representative 
of the views of the agency at large; that the documents “were not [formal 
interpretations] published by the Board to aid the interpretation of CAS 413”; 
and that the documents were written nine months after the issuance of CAS 
413. Id. at 5–7. Especially relevant here, WLF argued that the informality of 
the documents did not affect their weight under Auer, because “while this 
Court has recently refused to afford full Chevron deference to an agency inter-
pretation of a statute on the ground that the interpretation is insufficiently 
formal . . . it has never afforded anything less than full Seminole Rock deference 
to an informal agency interpretation of its own regulations.” Id. at 6 (citing 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997)); see also id. at 7 (“[I]n Auer, 
the agency’s interpretation came only in an amicus brief filed at the Court’s 
request, long after the promulgation of the relevant regulation.”). WLF’s con-
tention here that the informality of agency interpretations does not lessen the 
amount of deference they are owed is at odds with its later insistence in 
Christopher that no deference should be accorded to any agency interpretation 
that was not issued through the formal process of notice-and-comment rule-
making. 
104. Brief of Wash. Legal Found. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
supra note 103, at 3. 
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effort to justify its new litigating position and policy preference.”105 
WLF concludes that “allowing regulatory agencies to freely change their 
interpretations of regulations and statutes, without the formal pro-
tections of notice-and-comment rulemaking, threatens to significantly 
undercut the predictability that has long been a hallmark of our com-
mon law system.”106 
The NFIB also advocated drawing clear lines on the limits of Auer 
deference. And, as did the Chamber, it invoked the parroting exception 
to Auer deference: “DOL’s position is not aimed at interpreting an am-
biguous regulation” because the ambiguity “instead lies in the statutory 
language, which is merely reiterated by DOL’s implementing regula-
tions.”107 
PhRMA likewise aligned itself with the Chamber, WLF, and NFIB, 
arguing that “when an agency proffers a statutory interpretation in an 
amicus brief, without going through notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
it is not entitled to deference under either Chevron or Auer.”108 More-
over, deference would “upset[ ] settled expectations by departing abrup-
tly and without explanation from the Department’s long-established 
flexible definition of sales.”109 Consistency is key, according to PhRMA, 
because “an unexplained departure from an agency’s longstanding inter-
pretation of its regulation is ‘likely to reflect the agency’s reassessment 
of wise policy rather than a reassessment of what the agency itself origi-
nally meant.’” And “regulated entities structure their affairs on the 
assumption that an agency will not suddenly and without explanation 
abandon its long-held views.”110 
PhRMA also made vehement arguments against Auer deference in 
an amicus brief it submitted in support of a certiorari petition to the 
U.S. Supreme Court in In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation.111 
PhRMA took issue with the Second Circuit’s ruling that a Department 
 
105. Id. at 9. 
106. Id. at 2. 
107. Brief of Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Small Bus. Legal Ctr. as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of the Respondent at 22, SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156 
(No. 11-204). 
108. Brief of Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 4, SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (No. 11-204). 
According to PhRMA, Chevron deference was not warranted because an inter-
pretation announced in an amicus brief does not go through notice and 
comment rulemaking. And Auer deference was not warranted because the 
regulation merely parrots the statute. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 31 (quoting Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 
666, 682 (6th Cir. 2005).  
111. 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), abrogated by SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 
2156. 
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of Labor (DOL) amicus brief, in which the agency announced for the 
first time that pharmaceutical sales representatives are not exempt from 
the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements, was entitled to “controlling” 
deference under Auer.112 PhRMA characterized the Second Circuit’s 
application of Auer in its decision as “extreme,” because “[i]n focusing 
only on the Department’s interpretations on this appeal, and turning a 
blind eye to the dramatic change in position that the interpretations 
reflect, the Second Circuit allowed the Department to undo regulations 
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking and engineer a 
revolution in FLSA jurisprudence via the expedient of an unsolicited 
amicus brief.”113 But PhRMA went beyond the application of Auer 
deference in this case to criticize the doctrine more generally. It claimed 
that “the Auer line of cases has generated confusion,” and that “[t]he 
proper scope of deference to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations 
is an important question meriting certiorari in its own right.”114 PhRMA 
advocated for lesser or no deference to be accorded in cases where an 
agency has issued inconsistent interpretations of its regulations or where 
an agency invokes deference to attempt to circumvent the rulemaking 
process.115 
2. Steadfast Resistance 
What perhaps might be obscured amidst this backdrop of business 
groups’ oscillating positions on agency deference is that the Chamber 
of Commerce and NFIB have steadfastly resisted agency deference. In-
deed, these groups have waged a consistent, sustained attack on Auer 
deference, even when confronted with sympathetic agency views in a 
particular case. 
As discussed above, the Chamber resisted deference to the Depart-
ment of Labor in Auer. But it did so by attempting to carve out an 
inconsistency exception to agency deference; namely, where the agency 
has put forth varying interpretations, none should be entitled to defer-
ence.116 In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the Chamber 
mounted the beginnings of a broad-scale attack on Auer deference. The 
Chamber raised a normative objection to such deference, arguing that 
 
112. See Brief of Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (PhRMA) as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 3, In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 
141 (No. 10-460) (criticizing the Second Circuit’s application of Auer deference 
to an amicus brief that dramatically changed Department of Labor policy). 
113. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114. Id. at 3–4. 
115. Id. at 5–12. 
116. Brief Amici Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. & the Fair 
Labor Standards Act Reform Coal. in Support of Respondents, supra note 
92, at *16 n.7. 
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“granting controlling deference on issues not remotely addressed during 
a rulemaking would perversely invite agencies to avoid clear and com-
prehensive regulations accompanied by notice and comment and instead 
adopt major policy changes via amicus brief.”117 The Chamber drew a 
direct parallel to the Mead doctrine, which limits Chevron deference to 
situations where the agency has interpreted a statute after “engag[ing] 
in the sort of procedural formalities that indicate the agency was exer-
cising the authority ‘to make rules carrying the force of law.’”118 And 
the Chamber argued that Auer too must be limited lest agencies cir-
cumvent Mead by “simply pass[ing] a regulation parroting the statute, 
and then invok[ing] controlling deference under Auer to its interpre-
tation of its own regulation.”119 
At the time of Christopher, the NFIB was also seeking to curtail or 
limit Auer deference. The NFIB argued that “[w]hile deference to an 
agency’s interpretations may be appropriate in some circumstances, 
clear bounds need to be set to ensure that critical regulatory changes 
are not permitted to occur absent notice-and-comment procedures.”120 
At that time, the NFIB was starting to build an edifice of policy jus-
tifications for a wider-scale attack on Auer. Significantly, the NFIB 
claimed that “[p]ermitting agencies such as DOL to announce new poli-
cies through obscure methods, such as amicus filings, would have a 
devastating impact on industries,” including “massive retroactive lia-
bility.”121 NFIB further claimed that allowing agencies to “informally 
interpret statutory language” creates the risk that the “agency’s new 
position will have a detrimental sweeping effect across any entire in-
dustry.”122 NFIB also foreshadowed what would become its paramount 
concern regarding notice to the regulated community: “APA procedures 
guarantee that the regulated community is put on notice of proposed 
new regulations and changes to existing regulations” and that “the reg-
ulated community is given the opportunity to provide the agency with 
the benefit of its hands-on knowledge regarding how the regulatory 
changes will impact them.”123 
 
117. Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 5–6, 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (No. 11-
204). 
118. Id. at 20–21, (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27).  
119. Id. at 21. 
120. Brief of Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Small Bus. Legal Ctr. as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of the Respondent, supra note 107, at 23, SmithKline Beecham, 
132 S. Ct. 2156 (No. 11-204). 
121. Id. at 25–26. 
122. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted). 
123. Id. 
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But of course, in both Auer and Christopher, the DOL’s position 
was adverse to that of the relevant business communities. In this res-
pect, Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,124 wherein 
the agency position favored business interests, is a pivotal case that 
tests the nature of principled opposition to Auer deference. In Decker, 
the Northwest Environmental Defense Center sued the Oregon State 
Forester and several logging companies, alleging that they violated the 
Clean Water Act by using ditches and channels to funnel storm water 
runoff into nearby rivers without a permit.125 The EPA filed an amicus 
brief in support of the Oregon State Forester and logging companies, 
interpreting its regulations as not requiring permits for the runoff dis-
charges at issue.126 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, ruled 
against the EPA and in favor of the Northwest Environmental Defense 
Center.127 In its amicus brief before the U.S. Supreme Court, the EPA 
argued that, in the face of an ambiguous Rule, “the court of appeals 
should have deferred under Auer to EPA’s interpretation of its own 
Rule provided in the government’s amicus brief.”128 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court, several business groups—including 
the American Forest Resource Council, the National Alliance of Forest 
Owners, and the Chamber of Commerce—submitted amicus briefs. As 
might be expected, two of the business groups advocated deference to 
the EPA, which supported the relevant business community’s position. 
The American Forest Resource Council, a “nonprofit corporation that 
represents the forest products industry,” argued that the Ninth Circuit 
decision should be reversed because it “failed to give deference to the 
[EPA’s] long-standing interpretation” of its Rule.129 And the National 
Alliance of Forest Owners, a “trade association representing owners and 
managers of over 79 million acres of private forests in 47 states,” like-
wise criticized the Ninth Circuit for “fail[ing] to afford Auer deference 
to EPA’s longstanding construction of its Rule.”130 
 
124. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013). 
125. Id. at 1328–29.  
126. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, 
Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338, 11-347). 
127. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011). 
128. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 
(Nos. 11-338, 11-347).  
129. Brief of Am. Forest Res. Council, Pub. Lands Council, Nat’l Cattlemen’s 
Beef Ass’n, Mont. Wood Prods. Ass’n Inc., Ark. Forestry Ass’n, Fed. Forest 
Res. Coal., Inc. & Intermountain Forest Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners at 1, 7, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338, 11-347). 
130. Brief for Nat’l All. of Forest Owners et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 1, 27, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338, 11-347). The 
National Alliance of Forest Owners conceded that “[s]uch deference is to be 
denied in certain circumstances,” but concluded that “there was no reason to 
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Here, significantly, the Chamber took a different tack. Notwithstan-
ding the fact that the EPA’s interpretation supported the Chamber’s 
position, the Chamber explicitly disavowed the agency’s claim to de-
ference and based its arguments on independent legal grounds. The 
Chamber argued that the rule unambiguously exempts logging ditches 
and channels from the permit requirement and thus claimed that the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation to the contrary was erroneous.131 The 
Chamber went out of its way to disavow the EPA’s reasoning, stating 
that “[w]hile the United States ultimately reaches the correct outcome 
. . . its analysis is plainly wrong.”132 According to the Chamber, Auer 
deference had no role to play in the analysis and it warned that to 
“defer to the agency’s position [here] would be to permit the agency, 
under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new 
regulation.”133 
The Chamber transitioned into a full-scale attack on Auer, empha-
sizing the “perverse incentives propelling [agencies] toward crafting 
ambiguous rules when they are asked . . . to implement statutes through 
regulations” and the “related danger” whereby “[e]ven where a regu-
lation itself is not ambiguous, an agency might well strain to manu-
facture a false, post hoc ambiguity and thereby create administrative 
 
deny it here.” Id. (citing SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2166). And, in a 
footnote, the National Alliance also pointed out that the Ninth Circuit had 
failed to “articulate why EPA’s interpretation of ambiguous terms such as 
‘nonpoint source’ did not warrant deference under Chevron.” Id. at 13 n.5. The 
NFIB brief did not address Auer, but argued that the Court should accord 
Chevron deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Brief 
of Amicus Curiae of The Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Small Bus. Legal Ctr. at 
3, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338, 11-347) (“[T]he EPA’s Silviculture 
Rule deserves Chevron deference because the agency provided a reasoned 
explanation for exempting timber harvesting operations from NPDES per-
mitting requirements consistent with the principles of federalism entailed in 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.”). NFIB did caution that Chevron “does 
not vest [an agency] with unbridled discretion to resolve ambiguities in any 
conceivable manner. The agency’s interpretation must be reasonable, and must 
comport with the background principles of our constitutional system.” Id. It 
did state unequivocally, however, that “Chevron deference is not paramount 
to . . . judicial abdication.” Id. at 5. 
131. Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. in Support of 
Petitioners at 14–18, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338, 11-347). 
132. Id. at 19. 
133. Id. (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)). See also id. 
(arguing that because “Auer deference is warranted only when the language of 
the regulation is ambiguous,” even the “EPA has no discretion to read the 
[Rule] as the Ninth Circuit did” (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588)). 
Moreover, the Chamber argued that the EPA’s “shifting positions in this liti-
gation undermine any agency deference that [it] might otherwise be entitled 
to claim.” Id. at 20 (citing SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2167–68). 
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flexibility that allows the agency to dispense with notice and comment 
before effecting regulatory changes.”134 
The Chamber continued its concerted assault on Auer in Perez v. 
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n.135 Perez was yet another case addressing the 
 
134. Id. at 21–22 (citing SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2168). 
135. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). The Chamber and NFIB have, moreover, waged this 
frontal assault on Auer in the lower courts. For example, in Rivera v. Peri 
& Sons Farms Inc., 755 F. 3d 892 (9th Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2819 (2014), the Chamber joined a coalition brief urging the U.S. Supreme 
Court to grant certiorari to overturn the Ninth Circuit’s decision giving de-
ference to the DOL’s interpretation of the FLSA as requiring employers to 
reimburse foreign workers’ pre-employment travel and immigration expenses. 
See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. & Nat’l Mining Ass’n as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3–6, Rivera, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 
13-950) (asking the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari specifically to 
reconsider Auer). The Chamber characterized Auer deference as a “doctrine 
[that] arose from a single sentence in the 1945 Seminole Rock decision, which 
was then cited and applied in subsequent cases without any examination of 
the rule’s underlying merits.” Id. at 3. It asked the Court to “grant certiorari 
to squarely address the ongoing validity of the Auer doctrine,” noting that 
several Justices had recently “called for a reconsideration of Auer in an 
‘appropriate case’” and deeming this to be that appropriate case. Id. at 3–4. 
It explained that “[t]he scope of such deference is tremendously important to 
the business community, as administrative agencies have increasingly attemp-
ted to make policy through informal guidance rather than notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.” Id. at 4. NFIB likewise seized the opportunity to attack Auer. 
To NFIB, the case “squarely presents the issue of whether the judiciary is 
required to cede its power to interpret administrative regulations to adminis-
trative agencies.” Brief of Amici Curiae Ctr. for Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
Cato Inst. & Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Small Bus. Legal Ctr. in Support of 
Petitioner at 2, Rivera, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-950). NFIB’s brief revisits 
familiar anti-Auer arguments: the doctrine is “contrary to [the] fundamental 
principles of separation of powers” and represents “an abdication of [the 
judiciary’s] duty.” Id. at 2–3 (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 
131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). It rejects the premise that 
“the agency, the drafter of the regulation, has some special insight into its 
intent when enacting the regulation” as irrelevant for the purposes of the 
deference debate because “courts are bound by the language of the laws, not 
by ‘the unexpressed intention of those who made’ it.” Id. at 10 (citing Decker, 
133 S. Ct. at 1339–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting in relevant part)). It argues that 
“[a]ctive judicial review incentivizes agencies to promulgate unambiguous regu-
lations that give fair notice to the regulated community.” Id. at 11. The brief 
concludes with a section summarizing all of the opinions in which the Justices 
have voiced doubts about Auer. Id. at 13–15. See also Brief of Amici Curiae 
Se. Legal Found., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Small Bus. Legal Ctr., The 
Buckeye Inst., The Beacon Ctr. of Tenn. & Thomas P. Gross in Support of 
Petitioner at 5, Flytenow, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 137 S. Ct. 618 (2017) 
(No. 16-14) (urging the Court to grant certiorari not only to resolve the circuit 
split on the specific question of the deference owed to agency interpretations 
of common law terms, but also because “this case also provides an opportunity 
to address the doubts raised by several members of this Court as to the con-
tinued validity of Auer”). 
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scope of an exception to the FLSA overtime rule. The Department of 
Labor issued an opinion letter in 2006 stating that mortgage loan offi-
cers fell within the “administrative employee” exception to the overtime 
rule, then subsequently reversed its position in a second interpretation 
in 2010.136 The Mortgage Bankers Association sued the DOL for chang-
ing its interpretation without going through notice and comment rule-
making, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Mor-
tgage Bankers Association.137 Business groups filed six briefs in support 
of Mortgage Bankers.138  
Among those groups was the Chamber, which remained steadfast 
in its increasingly vociferous opposition to Auer.139 The Chamber 
argued that “[u]nder Auer, agencies can thwart meaningful feedback by 
promulgating vague legislative regulations and then interpreting those 
regulations as they see fit, knowing that courts must accept those inter-
pretations as long as they are not patently incompatible with the statu-
tory or regulatory text.”140 The Chamber’s brief is replete with a parade 
of horribles, or at least “serious concerns” raised by Auer: the threat to 
 
136. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., FLSA2006-11, Opinion Letter on 
Mortgage Loan Officers Under the FLSA (Mar. 31, 2006); Dep’t of Labor, 
Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-1 
(Mar. 24, 2010). 
137. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
138. Brief of the Nat’l Mining Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052); Brief for the Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. & Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. Ass’n as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052); Brief 
of Amici Curiae Util. Air Reg. Grp. & American Forest & Paper Ass’n in 
Support of Respondent, Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052); Brief 
of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., Am. Fuel & Petrochemical 
Mfrs., Am. Health Care Ass’n, Bus. Roundtable, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. & Secs. 
Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n in Support of Respondents, Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199 
(Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052); Brief for Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., Am. Farm 
Bureau Fed’n, Am. Petroleum Inst., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders & Retail 
Litig. Ctr. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Perez v. Mortg. Bankers 
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Quicken Loans, Inc. in Support of Respondent Mortg. Bankers Ass’ns, Perez 
v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052). 
139. The Chamber and NFIB were joined in their efforts to overrule Auer by several 
additional business groups filing amicus briefs. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 
Util. Air Reg. Grp. & American Forest & Paper Ass’n in Support of Respon-
dent, supra note 138, at 13–15 (urging the Court to overrule Auer/Seminole 
Rock and thus hold that if an agency interprets its rules outside the notice-
and-comment process, that interpretation is entitled to only Skidmore respect 
in accordance with its “power to persuade”). 
140. Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. et al. in Support of 
Respondents, supra note 138, at 6, 13–14. 
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separation of powers;141 the concern that “[a]gencies may not have 
special insight into what their regulations say, and their policy expertise 
is arguably irrelevant to the purely interpretive task of figuring out 
what the law is”; and the concern that “Auer deference ‘creates a risk 
that agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that 
they can later interpret as they see fit, thereby frustrating the notice 
and predictability purposes of rulemaking.’”142 The Chamber raises an 
issue of particular concern to businesses, namely that giving deference 
to agencies’ interpretive about-faces “would threaten the reliance inter-
ests of those who, because of the agency’s ambiguous legislative regu-
lations, must structure their affairs around interpretive rules.”143 
As might be expected, several other business groups, including the 
NFIB,144 endorsed the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, fram-
ing the doctrine as a way to prevent agencies from significantly chang-
ing interpretations to the detriment of businesses’ reliance interests and 
then receiving Auer deference for those interpretations.145 The National 
 
141. Id. at 14–15 (citing John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial 
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 
612, 638–54 (1996)). 
142. Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 
(2012)).  
143. Id. at 21. The Chamber elaborated: “Although the Due Process Clause and 
administrative law protections such as arbitrary and capricious review would 
guard against the most egregious threats to reliance interests, the high barriers 
posed by some of these doctrines might not shield reliance interests in the 
ordinary case where an agency changes its mind to the detriment of the 
regulated parties.” Id. at 21–22. 
144. Brief for Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, Am. Petroleum 
Inst., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders & Retail Litig. Ctr. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, supra note 138, at 21–22. 
145. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Quicken Loans Inc. in Support of Respondent 
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, supra note 138, at 16 (praising Paralyzed Veterans as 
“protect[ing] interests of regulated entities by requiring administrative agencies 
. . . to comply with the APA before substantively changing a prior definitive 
interpretation”); Brief for the Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. & 
Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra 
note 138, at 4 (similarly advocating for the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine). 
 The Washington Legal Foundation’s amicus brief primarily focused on persu-
ading the Court to uphold the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans rule, which 
WLF characterized as “an effective tool for distinguishing those rule revisions 
that are purely interpretative and do not have the force of law (and are thus 
exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements) from substantive 
rule revisions that are subject to those requirements.” Brief of Wash. Legal 
Found. & Allied Educ. Found. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 
2, Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (Nos. 13-1041, 12-1052). WLF expressed concern 
that, if it were overturned, “some federal agencies will seek to evade that proce-
dural requirement by adopting de facto amendments to substantive rules under 
the guise of merely ‘re-interpreting’ those rules.” Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The Anti-Deference Pro-Preemption Paradox at the U.S. Supreme Court 
833 
Mining Association (“NMA”) urged the Court to adopt a rule whereby 
“[a]n agency that wants to reverse itself and dispense with notice and 
comment must also abandon any claim to deference, justify its depar-
ture from the prior interpretation, and refrain from applying the new 
interpretation retroactively.”146 Recall that NMA was one of the groups 
that urged deference to the expertise of the Corps and the EPA in 
Coeur Alaska. Granted, Coeur Alaska did not entail an agency’s change 
in position. Even so, in Perez, the NMA expressed more general distaste 
for Auer: “[T]he same federal government that today tells the Court 
that agency interpretations are harmlessly non-binding will tomorrow 
demand that the courts treat such interpretations as binding. And un-
der current doctrine, the courts will generally agree, as long as the ag-
ency stays within the ‘considerable legal leeway’ that Auer deference 
extends.”147 
B. Implications for Federal Preemption 
In the federal preemption context, business groups tout the institu-
tional advantages that the FDA has over the state tort law system as 
a regulatory mechanism. The Product Liability Advisory Council 
(“PLAC”) summarizes the mainstream position, namely that the 
“judge, the jury, and the plaintiff in an individual case focus only on 
the particular matter before the court” and that “[i]n litigation, each 
lawyer’s obligation is solely to represent his or her client zealously.”148 
Accordingly, the “FDA, not lawyers for individual litigants, has the job 
of protecting the public health.”149 
 
 WLF invoked Auer in an interesting way to bolster its contention that the 
Department of Labor’s challenged position—that mortgage loan officers are 
not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions—was a substantive rule that 
was subject to notice-and-comment requirements. WLF pointed out that in 
other recent FLSA litigation, the Department had filed amicus briefs arguing 
that its position was entitled to Auer deference. Id. at 21–22. But because “this 
Court has made clear that interpretive rules are not entitled to Auer defer-
ence,” WLF reasoned, the Department’s “assertion that [its rule] is entitled to 
Auer deference is a strong indication that [it] deems [the rule to be] a substan-
tive rule, not an interpretive rule.” Id. at 22. Thus, instead of criticizing the 
Auer doctrine, WLF assumed its legitimacy in using it to prove a corollary 
point. 
146. Brief of the Nat’l Mining Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
supra note 138, at 26. According to the NMA, the “Court has already laid 
the groundwork for such a rule.” Id. at 27–28 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. 
v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 234–35 (2001)). 
147. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted).  
148. Brief of Prod. Liab. Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, supra note 18, at 22.  
149. Id.  
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In making pro-preemption arguments, amici repeatedly urge the 
Court to afford substantial weight to the views of an agency that state 
regulation interferes with the federal regulatory scheme that the agency 
has been charged with administering. Business groups have tended to 
invoke Auer (and Chevron) deference to support preemption, particu-
larly in the FDA context. 
The Chamber of Commerce has weighed in on a large number of 
preemption cases in the federal courts of appeals and U.S. Supreme 
Court.150 Neither the Chamber nor PhRMA has wavered from its pro-
 
150. The Chamber of Commerce has been involved in a large number of federal 
preemption cases, taking the following positions in these cases: Metro. 
Milwaukee Ass’n of Commerce v. Milwaukee Cty., 431 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 
2005) (urging the court to find that the National Labor Relations Act pre-
empted a county ordinance that required certain county-paid patient transport 
and patient care contractors to enter into labor peace agreements); Chamber 
of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008) (arguing that a Califor-
nia law prohibiting employers who receive more than $10,000 in state funds 
annually from using those funds “to assist, promote, or deter union organizing” 
was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act); Rowe v. N.H. Motor 
Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008) (urging the court to affirm the district 
court’s judgment that Maine’s effort to regulate motor carrier traffic where it 
involved the transport of tobacco products is preempted by the Motor Carrier 
Act and the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act); Mason v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2010) (urging the Seventh 
Circuit to hold that a state law failure to warn claim is conflict-preempted by 
the FDA’s rejection of additional warnings for a class of anti-depressant drugs); 
Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012) (arguing that the 
Federal Railroad Safety Acts preempted state-law-based tort claims relating 
to injury sustained during the manufacture of locomotive equipment); Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096 (2013) (arguing 
that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempted a 
municipal government program barring federally licensed motor carriers from 
access to a port); Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 
(2d Cir. 2013) (asking the court to find that the Atomic Energy Act pre-
empted conflicting Vermont state regulations); Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 738 F.3d 387 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (urging 
the court to vacate OSHA’s amendments to the Hazard Communication Stan-
dard announcing that state tort claims were no longer preempted); Am.’s 
Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, 742 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2014) (urging the court 
to hold that a Georgia law imposing additional reporting requirements on self-
funded insurance plans was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act); Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014) (arguing that state 
law claims for breach of implied-by-law covenants are preempted by the Airline 
Deregulation Act); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 
(2015) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause confers a private right of action to 
enjoin states from enforcing preempted state law); Penske Logistics, LLC v. 
Dilts, 135 S. Ct. 2049 (2015) (urging the U.S. Supreme Court to grant a peti-
tion for certiorari to clarify that the Federal Aviation Administration Auth-
orization Act preempted California’s meal and rest break laws as applied to 
motor carriers); Little v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 805 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 
2015) (asking the court to hold that the Clean Air Act preempted state com-
mon law nuisance claims); Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 
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preemption view. But with respect to reliance on Auer deference, there 
may be some trace evidence of a shifting away. The Chamber did not 
weigh in on PLIVA, but it did intervene (in a joint amicus brief with 
PhRMA) in Mutual Pharmaceutical, where it argued for preemption 
with nary a mention of Auer. 
1. Traditional Business Position: Deference to FDA Supports  
Pro-Preemption View 
The traditional pro-preemption business position is consistently put 
forth by PLAC, a “nonprofit association with more than 120 corporate 
members representing a broad cross-section of American and interna-
tional product manufacturers.”151 Time and again, PLAC has invoked 
deference to the FDA in advocating preemption of state tort claims 
against medical device and drug manufacturers. 
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., PLAC cites various FDA statements 
to bolster its claim that “[i]n enacting the express preemption provision 
in the MDA, Congress determined that imposition of state requirements 
in addition to or different from federal regulation would undermine 
public health.”152 PLAC draws attention to the fact that the “FDA has 
stated in [the U.S. Supreme Court], in Courts of Appeals, and in the 
preamble to regulations, [that] allowing state judges and juries to 
second-guess the FDA’s approval of [medical devices], or to dictate 
different requirements than FDA has imposed, impedes FDA’s ability 
to fulfill its mandate in furtherance of public health.”153 PLAC points 
to the FDA’s preemption preamble to its drug labeling regulation, 
which states that “‘[s]tate-law attempts to impose additional warnings 
lead to labeling that does not accurately portray a product’s risks’ and 
 
(2016) (urging the U.S. Supreme Court to hold that a Vermont law that im-
posed record keeping and reporting obligations on self-employed plans beyond 
those required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act was pre-
empted); Cook v. Dow Chem. Co., 136 S. Ct. 2055 (2016) (asking the Supreme 
Court to grant a petition for certiorari and find that the Price-Anderson Act 
preempted state law claims by a plaintiff who suffered a nuclear-related 
injury); Johnson & Johnson v. Reckis, 136 S. Ct. 896 (2016) (asking the U.S. 
Supreme Court to grant a petition for certiorari and hold that the FDA’s 
rejection of warning language proposed in a Citizen Petition is “clear evidence” 
sufficient to preempt state tort failure to warn claims); Puerto Rico v. Franklin 
Ca. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (arguing that the federal 
Bankruptcy Code preempted a Puerto Rico statute creating a mechanism for 
Puerto Rico’s struggling public utilities to restructure their debts).  
151. Brief of Prod. Liab. Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, supra note 18, at 1. 
152. Id. at 4. 
153. Id. 
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threaten [the] ‘FDA’s statutorily prescribed role as the expert Federal 
agency responsible for evaluating and regulating drugs.’”154 
PLAC has likewise been a staunch advocate for federal preemption 
in the prescription drug context. In Wyeth, PLAC explicitly calls for 
the Court to accord deference to FDA determinations that state law 
could threaten to upset a federal regulatory scheme that the agency has 
been tasked with implementing.155 PLAC claims the “FDA’s interpre-
tation of the FDCA is clear” that FDA approval of labeling preempts 
contrary state law, and that in “reaching the opposite conclusion . . . 
[t]he Vermont Supreme Court’s failure to defer to the FDA’s interpre-
tation of the FDCA is contrary to [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.”156 
PLAC is emphatic that the FDA’s position is “reasonable and entitled 
to full deference.”157 Nor, PLAC argues, should “[t]he fact that the FDA 
has articulated its preemption determination in a regulatory preamble 
and a series of amicus briefs . . . diminish the deference owed that 
determination” because an “agency’s conclusion that federal law pre-
empts state law may properly be communicated in ‘regulations, pream-
bles, interpretive statements and responses to comments.’”158 Moreover, 
citing Auer, PLAC argues that the fact that the “‘agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the matter in question’ is conveyed ‘in the form 
of a legal brief’ does not make the agency’s view ‘unworthy of def-
erence.’”159 
 
154. Id. at 22 (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for 
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 
(Jan. 24, 2006)). 
155. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Prod. Liab. Advisory Council, Inc. in Support 
of Petitioner at 4, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (No. 06-1249). 
156. Id. at 30. PLAC cites Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 
U.S. 707, 714–15 (1985), for the proposition that when, “as in the case of the 
FDA, Congress has delegated authority to an expert federal agency to im-
plement and enforce a federal regulatory scheme, the agency’s determination 
that state law threatens to upset federal objectives ‘is dispositive . . . unless 
either the agency’s position is inconsistent with clearly expressed congressional 
intent, or subsequent developments reveal a change in that position.’” Id. at 
31 (omission in original). 
157. Id. at 32.  
158. Id. (quoting Hillsborough Cty., 471 U.S. at 718). 
159. Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). PLAC also disputed 
the lower court’s rejection of Chevron deference. The Vermont Supreme Court 
disregarded the FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA in part because it believed 
that “Congress, in a savings clause, expressly limited implied preemption in 
the drug context to situations in which compliance with federal and state 
law is a physical impossibility,” and “[Chevron] deference to an agency’s inter-
pretation is appropriate only when a statute is silent or ambiguous with res-
pect to the specific issue the agency has considered.” Id. at 33 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). PLAC argued that the Vermont Supreme Court’s belief 
was wrong because it was rooted in a misinterpretation of the U.S. Supreme 
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Other affected industry groups have also weighed in on federal pre-
emption before the U.S. Supreme Court. In Riegel, the Advanced 
Medical Technology Association and Medical Device Manufacturers 
Association, whose members consist of medical device manufacturers, 
characterize the FDA as “an expert federal agency,” which “Congress 
has charged . . . with striking a careful balance of public health objec-
tives.”160 It claims that the FDA has a “unique vantage point” since it 
“‘holds the only broad, cross-cutting knowledge’ and ‘experience with 
the totality of other applications,’ and also utilizes its knowledge of ‘the 
latest science.’”161 In contrast, “lay juries are not institutionally well-
equipped to make the kinds of nuanced risk-benefit calculations and 
scientific judgments Congress has charged FDA—as the expert federal 
agency—with making.”162 In making this argument, the Association 
drew from an FDA amicus brief in which the FDA “cautioned that 
state common-law tort actions which ‘encourage, and in fact require, 
lay judges and juries to “second-guess” FDA’s balancing of the benefits 
and risks of a specific device, create pressures for “defensive labeling” 
. . .[and] result[ ] in scientifically unsubstantiated warnings and under-
utilization of beneficial treatments.’”163 
Picking up this same theme of contrasting federal agency regulation 
with state tort liability, CropLife America, the American Chemistry 
Council, and Consumer Specialty Products Association, whose members 
consist of pesticide manufacturers, claim that “[c]onflicting or differing 
jury verdicts, which indisputably have a regulatory effect on a product’s 
manufacturer, can impede, impair, or destroy the national uniformity 
that Congress seeks to achieve under the auspices of expert and experi-
enced federal agencies such as FDA and EPA.”164 And they likewise 
extol regulation by agency experts, urging that “consumer protection is 
enhanced when highly experienced federal agencies, staffed by dedicated 
 
Court’s implied preemption doctrine, but did not otherwise contest the lower 
court’s explanation of the Chevron doctrine’s applicability. Id. 
160. Brief of the Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n (ADVAMED), DRI, MedMarc & 
the Med. Device Mfrs. Ass’n (MDMA) as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 1, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (No. 06-179). 
161. Id. at 9–10 (quoting Food & Drug Admin., Innovation or Stagnation: 
Challenge and Opportunity on the Critical Path to New Medical 
Products 13 (2004), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/ 
SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/CriticalPathOpportunitiesReports/UC
M113411.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q86P-2V38]). 
162. Id. at 15–16. 
163. Id. at 27 (quoting Letter-Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 
25–26, Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-4597)). 
164. Brief of CropLife Am., Am. Chem. Council & Consumer Specialty Prods. Ass’n 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 
U.S. 312 (2008) (No. 06-179). 
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scientific experts, regulate products such as medical devices, drugs, and 
pesticides in a nationally uniform manner.”165 In sum, the pesticide 
manufacturers conclude that the “substantial health, safety, environ-
mental, and product performance benefits that nationally uniform, 
EPA-regulated product labeling affords to consumers, farmers, and pro-
fessional pesticide applicators cannot be over-stated” and that the 
“same undoubtedly is true for nationally uniform medical device and 
drug labeling.”166 
Groups such as PLAC do not have much interest in the Auer line 
of cases, so there is no way to gauge whether their pro-agency advocacy 
would hold up outside of the preemption context. But, significantly, 
groups such as PhRMA and the Chamber of Commerce do. 
2. Whither Steadfast Resistance to Auer? 
The Chamber and PhRMA have never wavered in their pro-pre-
emption positions. But the enthusiasm with which they wield Auer de-
ference in support may be wavering. 
a. Auer Deference Wielded to Support Preemption 
In Wyeth, PhRMA, along with the Biotechnology Industry Organi-
zation (“BIO”)—whose “members are involved in research and develop-
ment of innovative healthcare technologies”—submitted a brief advo-
cating for Auer deference.167 Both groups insisted that the Vermont 
Supreme Court misinterpreted the FDA’s drug labeling regulation as 
“grant[ing] manufacturers general permission to ‘add and strengthen 
warnings’ without prior FDA approval,” whereas “FDA has long inter-
preted its regulation as creating a limited exception that applies only 
to ‘concerns about newly discovered risks’ and ‘important new informa-
tion about the safe use of a drug.’”168 According to PhRMA and BIO, 
this FDA “interpretation of the substantive meaning of its own regu-
lation is entitled to substantial judicial deference” under Auer.169 
 
165. Id. at 13.  
166. Id. at 18. 
167. Brief for PhRMA & BIO as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
23, at 2. 
168. Id. at 29–30 (citing New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 
46,622, 46,623, 46,635 (Oct. 19, 1982)). 
169. Id. at 30. PhRMA and BIO also argue that “an agency’s determination that 
a state law poses an obstacle to achieving the purposes and objectives of federal 
law is also entitled to a degree of judicial deference.” Id. at 30 n.14 (citing 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) and Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000)). 
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Likewise, in Fussman v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.,170 
PhRMA squarely relied on Auer deference in an amicus brief urging the 
U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari to overturn a Fourth Circuit 
decision finding that state law failure to warn liability is not preempted 
by the FDA’s authority.171 After describing the FDA’s label approval 
process, PhRMA argued that the “FDA’s view that its CBE regulation 
permits a unilateral label change only when justified by new and signi-
ficant information easily satisfies” the “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulations” test for receiving Auer deference.172 
Recall, however, that only three years later, PhRMA intervened as 
amicus in Christopher, joining forces with the Chamber and NFIB in 
resisting Auer deference.173 Specifically, it argued that “when an agency 
proffers a statutory interpretation in an amicus brief, without going 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is not entitled to deference 
under either Chevron or Auer.”174 Perhaps to reconcile this reliance on 
Auer with its prior position in In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation, 
PhRMA noted specifically in Fussman that the interpretation in this 
case “is the agency’s longstanding and consistent view, dating back to 
the 1982 promulgation of the regulation.”175 
Another group to have struggled to reconcile its general anti-agency 
inclination with its reliance on agency deference arguments in pre-
emption litigation is the Washington Legal Foundation (“WLF”). In 
2006, the WLF issued a press release calling for deference to be given 
to an FDA statement of policy outlining the agency’s pro-preemption 
position.176 WLF “praised the [FDA] for issuing a policy statement in-
dicating that manufacturers who label their drugs in accordance with 
 
170. 509 F. App’x 215 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 88 (2013). 
171. See Brief for Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner, Fussman, 134 S. Ct. 88 (No. 12-1339). 
172. Id. at 8 (quoting PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 615 (2011)). 
173. See supra Part II.A.1.b.  
174. Brief of Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (PhRMA) as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondent, supra note 108, at 4. According to PhRMA, Chevron 
deference was not warranted because an interpretation announced in an 
amicus brief does not go through notice and comment rulemaking. And Auer 
deference was not warranted because the regulation merely parrots the statute. 
Id. at 28. 
175. Brief for Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 171, at 9. 
176. Press Release, Wash. Legal Found., WLF Hails FDA Policy Statement on 
Preemption of Failure-to-Warn Suits (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.wlf.org/ 
upload/012506RS.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7X7-B7DY]. 
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FDA policy cannot be sued under state law for failure to include addi-
tional safety warnings in their product labeling.”177 According to then–
WLF Chief Counsel Richard Samp, “[t]he policy statement does not 
represent a shift in FDA’s views; FDA has taken the same position in 
litigation for several years. Nonetheless, issuing the policy statement is 
an important step, because it significantly increases the likelihood that 
courts will heed FDA’s views.”178 WLF noted that “because views ex-
pressed in the course of litigation are not deemed official positions of a 
federal agency courts [had not been] required to defer to FDA’s 
views.”179 But “WLF argued that because those views have been incor-
porated into an official policy statement, courts are now required to 
give deference to FDA’s interpretation of federal law.”180 Accordingly, 
in its amicus brief in Wyeth, WLF took the position that the “FDA’s 
view that the imposition of liability under state law for defendant’s 
alleged failure to warn would interfere with FDA’s accomplishment of 
regulatory objectives is in our view entitled to at least as much defer-
ence, if not more, as the FDA’s view of its preemption authority.”181 
WLF’s position here contradicts its emphatic endorsement—three 
years later in Christopher—of the Wyeth Court’s ultimate refusal to 
give deference to the FDA’s interpretation of the scope of its own pre-
emption authority. Indeed, its amicus brief cited with approval the 
Court’s refusal in Wyeth to give deference to the FDA’s interpretation 
of the scope of its own preemption authority in light of the FDA’s 
“procedural failure” in failing to give an opportunity for notice and 
comment, and advocated that “[t]he same result should obtain here.”182 
It also echoed Justice Scalia’s warning in Talk America that “allowing 
an agency to both promulgate its own rules as well as interpret them 
‘frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and 
promotes arbitrary government.’”183 
 
177. Id. at 1. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 2. 
180. Id. 
181. Brief of Wash. Legal Found. & Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2008) 
(No. 06-1249) (quoting Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 275 (3d Cir. 
2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009)). 
182. Brief of Wash. Legal Found. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
supra note 103, at 16 (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 577). 
183. Id. at 10–11 (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)). To be sure, WLF did not take a categorically 
anti-Auer position in Christopher. It acknowledged that “[u]nder Auer, an 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation is sometimes entitled to 
deference because it is presumed that the agency is best situated to interpret 
its own words.” Id. at 18. But it made clear that “an agency cannot properly 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The Anti-Deference Pro-Preemption Paradox at the U.S. Supreme Court 
841 
Even the Chamber of Commerce, otherwise so scrupulously consis-
tent in opposing Auer deference, has wavered in this line of cases. In 
Riegel, the Chamber argued that the MDA preempted requirements 
imposed by state tort law. For support, it cited the brief submitted by 
the Solicitor General at the petition stage, noting that “the FDA 
interprets Section 360k(a) as expressly preempting state tort claims 
that seek to impose different or additional requirements on devices that 
have won premarket approval.”184 The Chamber also cites additional 
statements made by the FDA as amicus in another device preemption 
case, noting that the “FDA recognizes that the MDA’s express 
preemption clause furthers not only Congress’s goal of protecting 
innovation and reducing regulatory burdens but also its goal of pro-
tecting and promoting the public health.”185 
In Wyeth, the Chamber criticized the Vermont Supreme Court, 
which had ruled against Wyeth below, for “declin[ing] to give any 
weight to certain statements made by the FDA relating to preemption 
and the adverse and disruptive effects of certain state-law product li-
ability lawsuits on the federal regulatory scheme.”186 In doing so, the 
Chamber explicitly invoked Auer deference. According to the Chamber, 
the lower court’s interpretation of a key FDA regulation ran counter to 
the FDA’s own interpretation of the provision.187 Moreover, the Cham-
ber, citing Auer, asserted that the “FDA’s longstanding interpretation 
of the CBE regulation is entitled to deference under settled principles 
of administrative law.”188 
 
claim to be ‘interpreting’ a regulation when it is in effect changing that regu-
lation.” Id. 
184. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Respondent, supra note 18, at 6. 
185. Id. at 7. 
186. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner at 7–8, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (No. 06-1249). 
The Chamber also took the lower court to task for its reliance on the 
“presumption against preemption.” Id. at 7.  
187. Id. at 10–11 (explaining that the lower court “incorrectly thought that Section 
314.70 [the “Changes Being Effected” provision of the FDA’s labeling regu-
lations] allowed Wyeth to make unilateral changes to [Phenergan’s] drug 
label[ ] without obtaining prior FDA approval whenever [Wyeth] believes it 
will make the product safer,” when “[i]n fact, the FDA has long interpreted 
the CBE regulation as permitting changes to labeling only where the changes 
reflect newly discovered information about the drug’s safety—information that 
the FDA has not previously considered.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
188. Id. at 11 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). The Chamber 
also implicitly endorsed Chevron deference by urging that “courts should apply 
the ordinary rules relating to deference to administrative agencies’ interpreta-
tions of the statutes and regulations they administer at this first step of the 
[conflict preemption] analysis,” in which the court interprets the relevant 
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b. Preemption Reconsidered 
We return to the puzzle in PLIVA; namely, Justice Thomas’ cur-
ious invocation of Auer deference to sustain the pro-preemption hold-
ing. The Chamber did not participate as an amicus in PLIVA,189 so in 
this case, the Court did not seem to be following the Chamber’s urging. 
Petitioners PLIVA and Actavis each addressed Auer deference. 
PLIVA reminded the Court that the FDA “interpreted the CBE provi-
sion to . . . preclude deviations between the branded and generic product 
labeling.”190 And, PLIVA contended, the “FDA’s settled interpretation 
of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference[,] . . . the 
virtually conclusive deference to which it is due” under Auer.191 The 
Actavis brief echoed the deference arguments made by PLIVA. It also 
argued that the FDA’s “regulations preempt state failure-to-warn 
claims which would require a generic manufacturer to unilaterally 
change its label” and even if “there were any ambiguity in the Agency’s 
 
federal and state laws. Id. at 30. Specifically, with respect to implied preemp-
tion analysis, the Chamber argued that when a court evaluates “the extent 
of the conflict between state and federal laws and . . . determin[es] whether 
the inconsistency rises to the level of a violation of the Supremacy Clause,” 
it is “entirely appropriate to afford substantial weight to the views of an admin-
istrative agency charged with implementing a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme in a technical area where, as here, the agency concludes, for persuasive 
reasons, that state regulation interferes with its regulatory regime or presents 
an obstacle to the achievement of federal objectives.” Id. at 30–31 (citing 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor 
Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000)). According to the Chamber, this “approach 
makes eminent sense” because “[t]he determination whether state law stands 
as an obstacle to a complex federal regulatory scheme often . . . involve[s] 
technical or policy-based judgments about the practical effect of state law on 
the efficient and effective operation of a complex statutory and regulatory 
scheme—judgments that an administrative agency such as the FDA is 
uniquely well suited to make.” Id. at 31–32. Thus, the Chamber argues, “the 
Court should also give substantial weight to the FDA’s 2006 statements [in 
the preamble to its drug labeling rule] relating to preemption and the adverse 
and disruptive effects of certain state-law product liability lawsuits on the 
federal regulatory scheme,” which are “persuasive and thus deserving of sub-
stantial weight in this Court.” Id. at 11. 
189. A likely explanation is that its members were divided on the issue—namely 
whether generic drug manufacturers should be shielded from liability by 
preemption whereas brand name manufacturers were not (in light of Wyeth). 
190. Brief of Petitioners PLIVA, Inc.; TEVA Pharm. USA Inc. & UDL Labs, Inc. 
at 43, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 
09-1501). 
191. Id.  
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regulations, . . . then the Agency’s consistent and longstanding inter-
pretation of those regulations would be entitled to deference” under 
Auer.192 
Nonetheless, as PLIVA pointed out in its brief, the FDA regulation 
at 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) explicitly stated that the duty of sameness app-
lied not only to the manufacturer’s initial label application to the FDA 
but also to “all amendments and supplements.”193 Justice Thomas could 
have opted to hold that this regulation was unambiguous on its face, 
thereby reaching the same conclusion without resorting to Auer. 
In Mutual Pharmaceutical, there was nary a mention of Auer, nor 
did any of the parties or other amici briefs invoke Auer. A joint amicus 
brief submitted by the Chamber and PhRMA, consistent with their 
prior amicus briefs in preemption cases, emphasized the comparative 
advantage of drug labeling regulation by the expert FDA over lay 
jurors. Thus, they argued that “FDA’s risk-benefit analyses should be 
favored because they are objectively better in promoting public health 
than equivalent determinations by votes of lay jurors” and because the 
“FDA relies on its experienced staff and panels of trained medical and 
pharmacological experts[, whereas] there is no suggestion that the lay 
jury in New Hampshire had the benefit of such expertise.”194 Moreover, 
they argued, “FDA review of a[] [New Drug Application] typically in-
cludes a year or more of close analysis; a jury trial may take a few days 
or weeks” and the “FDA must balance the benefits of the proposed drug 
to the entire treatable population against the potential incidence of its 
known risks” whereas “however instructed, a jury’s attention cannot 
help but be focused on a single, grievously injured individual.”195 
Conclusion: What the Future Holds 
The business community’s uniting in opposition to Auer deference 
is proceeding apace. In a recent case, Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, 
Inc.,196 business groups joined forces in an all-out assault on Auer de-
ference. The National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”) urged the 
 
192. Brief of Petitioners Actavis Inc. & Actavis Elizabeth LLC at 22, Mensing, 
564 U.S. 604 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039,09-1501). 
193. Brief of Petitioners PLIVA, Inc.; TEVA Pharms. USA Inc. & UDL Labs, 
Inc., supra note 190, at 33. 
194. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. of Am. & Pharm. Research & 
Mfrs. of Am. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 20. 
195. Id. 
196. 799 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016). The Bible 
case involved the question whether a borrower’s state-law breach of contract 
claim against a guaranty agency for her student loans is preempted by the 
Higher Education Act (HEA). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
the claim was not preempted by the HEA because it did not conflict with 
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U.S. Supreme Court to take the case given that “[t]his case presents an 
ideal opportunity to overrule the deferential perspectives mandated by 
Auer . . . and . . . Seminole Rock.”197 It noted the “[s]erious concerns 
regarding Auer and Seminole Rock deference [that] have been voiced 
by the Chief Justice and other members of this Court” and raised the 
specter of “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative 
state.”198 WLF joined groups like NAM199 in calling for Auer deference 
to be “reject[ed] . . . once and for all.”200 WLF warned ominously that 
“if the Court allows the rule of deference announced in Auer . . . [and] 
 
federal law and opined that the contract at issue “simply incorporate[d] app-
licable federal regulations as the standard for compliance.” Id. at 639. In so 
holding, the court deferred to the Secretary of Education’s interpretations of 
the applicable statutes and regulations as providing that “a guaranty agency 
may not impose collection costs on a borrower who is in default for the first 
time but who has timely entered into and complied with an alternative repay-
ment agreement.” Id. 
197. Brief of Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. & the Nat’l Shooting Sports Found., Inc. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Bible, 799 F.3d 633 (No. 15-861). 
198. Id. at 3 (quoting City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 
1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). The brief cited all of the 
Justices’ opinions expressing reservations about Auer from City of Arlington, 
Decker, and Perez. NAM explained that “Amici are concerned that such 
deference may actually provide disincentives for regulatory clarity, thereby 
sacrificing notice and predictability in rulemaking,” and suggested that Auer 
“might be understood as an end-run around rulemaking in the extreme.” Id. 
at 4–5 (quoting Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness 
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 552 
(2003)). NAM insisted that Auer conflicts with the APA, which “allocates 
interpretive authority to the judiciary,” and threatens separation of powers. 
Id. at 8–13. NAM took particular issue with agency interpretations announced 
in an amicus brief during litigation, outside of the context of rulemaking, as 
was true in the case at hand. Id. at 13–14. 
199. Nor has NAM been steadfast in its resistance to Auer. Consider, for example, 
its amicus brief in In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & 4(d) 
Rule Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2011). NAM argued that the Fish and 
Wildlife Service’s “preambles and documents interpret[ing]” the Endangered 
Species Act rules “are entitled to deference” under Auer. Memorandum of 
the Nat’l Trade Ass’ns in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judg-
ment on the 4(d) Rule & in Support of Fed. Defendants’ Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the 4(d) Rule at 14, In re Polar Bear Endangered 
Species Act Listing & 4(d) Rule Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 65 (Nos. 1:08-cv-2113, 
1:09-cv-0159). More generally, NAM argued that on “science issues, judicial 
review must generally be at its most deferential” because “a federal agency 
must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified 
experts even if the court might find contrary views more persuasive.” Id. (inter-
nal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
200. Brief of Professor Philip Hamburger & Wash. Legal Found., as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 2, Bible, 799 F.3d 633 (No. 15-861). 
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Seminole Rock . . . to stand, it will sanction a profound and ongoing 
injustice that damages its reputation.”201 
But the Bible case was litigated and decided in the era of President 
Obama. Will the business community need to rally for Auer’s demise 
in what promises to be an era of minimal regulation under the Trump 
Administration? In the wake of President Trump’s early initiatives sig-
naling regulatory rollback, the NFIB has predicted that “[f]or small 
businesses, 2017 may end up being the year the regulatory tide 
turn[s].”202 More specifically, the NFIB characterized Executive Order 
13771,203 in conjunction with the regulatory freeze ordered by White 
House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus on January 20, 2017, as “a very 
lethal weapon against regulatory overreach.”204 In a similar vein, the 
Chamber has pronounced that “[a]fter years of talk, Washington is act-
ually starting to tame the regulatory leviathan.”205 If the President him-
self has expressed wariness of “a system that no longer imposes any 
 
201. Id. The brief articulated two primary arguments for renouncing Auer. First, 
it argued that Auer deference “requires Article III judges to abandon their 
office and duty of independent judgment” under the Constitution. Id. at 3. 
Second, it argued that because “Auer precommits judges to favor one party 
over another” where one of those parties is a federal agency, it “requires 
judges to adopt a systematic bias in favor of the government” that violates 
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law. Id. at 4.  
202. President Trump Is Pushing Regulations out the Door, Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.nfib.com/content/analysis/national/ 
donald-trump-is-pushing-regulations-out-the-door/ [https://perma.cc/K3NW-
DRWR]. 
203. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
204. Id. On the day that President Trump announced Executive Order 13771, 
the NFIB issued a press release: “[t]he President’s order is a good first step 
on the long road toward eliminating ball-and-chain regulations so small busi-
nesses can create jobs and expand the economy.” NFIB Welcomes Trump’s 
Actions on Regulations, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (Jan. 30, 2017), http:// 
www.nfib.com/content/press-release/economy/nfib-welcomes-trumps-actions-
on-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/7GM6-W2X4]. The statement urged reg-
ulatory agencies and the Office of Management and Budget to “keep . . . in 
mind” that “the extraordinary costs and complexity of regulations falls hardest 
on America’s small and independent businesses.” Id. 
205. Sean Hackbarth, How Congress and Trump Are Taming the Regulatory 
Leviathan, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Feb. 14, 2017, 5:15 PM), https:// 
www.uschamber.com/above-the-fold/how-congress-and-trump-are-taming-
the-regulatory-leviathan [https://perma.cc/5LTB-HMJY]. Unlike NFIB, the 
Chamber did not immediately issue a statement regarding Executive Order 
13771, but two weeks later, its senior vice president and chief policy officer 
said in an interview that it is not the two-for-one provision, but rather the 
provision requiring the net cost of all new regulations to be zero that “really 
can have a profound impact. It gives you a new target for when you’re writing 
regulations.” Juliet Eilperin, Why Trump’s Order to Cut Government Regu-
lation Is Even Bolder Than It Seems, Wash. Post. (Feb. 13, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/02/13/why-trumps-
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meaningful checks on executive action,”206 and has nominated agency 
heads who enthusiastically share his views, need the business com-
munity fear overzealous agency action or expansive interpretations of 
agency power? 
Alternatively, should the steadfast resistance to Auer deference 
hold, what would that mean in the preemption context? If Auer defer-
ence is no longer a reliable pillar of preemption in the generic drug 
preemption context (and beyond), business groups might switch gears 
with an increased emphasis on lobbying affected agencies for preemptive 
rulemaking as well as increased efforts lobbying Congress for express 
preemption provisions.207 
 
order-to-cut-government-regulation-is-even-bolder-than-it-seems/ [https:// 
perma.cc/6ZZN-4799]. 
206. Brief of Amici Curiae Se. Legal Found., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Small 
Bus. Legal Ctr., The Buckeye Inst., The Beacon Ctr. of Tenn. & Thomas P. 
Gross in Support of Petitioner, supra note 135 at 5. 
207. Business groups have already turned their attention to Congress with respect 
to reining in the regulatory state. The Chamber’s website notes that “now is 
the time to seriously think about how federal regulations get made,” insisting 
that “[w]hile the Constitution requires a lot of effort to write a new law, over 
the decades it’s become relatively easy for federal agencies to write regulations 
that have the full weight of law,” to which “federal courts have given . . . 
tremendous deference.” Hackbarth, supra note 205. As a solution, the Cham-
ber proposes the Regulatory Accountability Act, which recently passed the 
House vote and will soon be before the Senate. Id.; Letter from 616 Bus. 
Grps. & Ass’ns to Mitch McConnell and Charles Schumer, Senate Majority 
Leader and Democratic Leader (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.uschamber.com/ 
sites/default/files/documents/files/2.6.17-_multi-association_letter_to_ 
senate_supporting_the_regulatory_accountability_act.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/F557-KESB]. Significantly, the Regulatory Accountability Act bill—
which includes the Separation of Powers Restoration Act—amends 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706 to eliminate judicial deference to an agency’s determination of the costs 
and benefits or other economic or risk assessment if the agency failed to 
conform to guidelines established by OIRA, determinations made in the adop-
tion of an interim rule, or guidance. See Regulatory Accountability Act of 
2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. sec. 107, § 706. It is thus not a stretch to imagine 
such groups urging Congress to intervene in the federal preemption context 
as well. And this approach, moreover, would obviate the need to rely on 
deference to federal agencies in that context. 
